



Solving the transnational lists design conundrum

Understanding the Ranked apportionment method

For more: eudemocracy.eu/ranked-apportionment-method-council-report

European Parliament Proposal ^(1/2)

- **Single constituency:** all votes cast on the “second vote” are tallied at EU level.
- **Party proportionality:** seats are attributed to lists in proportion to the votes they receive.
- **Straight distribution:** candidates are elected in the order on which they stand on their respective lists.
- **Avoiding over-representation:** Member States are split in three groups and the order of the list must alternate not just nationalities but also groups in “sections of three slots”.

Note: across this document, links are provided to our main report () , including a full drafting of the proposed amendments.

European Parliament Proposal (2/2)

Group A (5 Member States)			Group B (10 Member States)			Group C (12 Member States)		
1	Germany	83.166.711	6	Romania	19.328.838	16	Denmark	5.822.763
2	France	67.320.216	7	Netherlands	17.407.585	17	Finland	5.525.292
3	Italy	59.641.488	8	Belgium	11.522.440	18	Slovakia	5.457.873
4	Spain	47.332.614	9	Greece	10.718.565	19	Ireland	4.964.440
5	Poland	37.958.138	10	Czech Republic	10.693.939	20	Croatia	4.058.165
			11	Sweden	10.327.589	21	Lithuania	2.794.090
			12	Portugal	10.295.909	22	Slovenia	2.095.861
			13	Hungary	9.769.526	23	Latvia	1.907.675
			14	Austria	8.901.064	24	Estonia	1.328.976
			15	Bulgaria	6.951.482	25	Cyprus	888.005
						26	Luxembourg	626.108
						27	Malta	514.564

Sections	Slot number	Candidate from
Section 1	1	A1
	2	B7
	3	C7
	4	B10
Section 2	5	C5
	6	A3
Section 3	7	A2
	8	C3
	9	B7
Section 4	10	B5
	11	C3
	12	A4
Section 5	13	A5
	14	C12
	15	B9
Section 6	16	A4
	17	A2
	18	B2
Section 7	19	B3
	20	A1
	21	B8
Section 8	22	C1
	23	C2
	24	B4
Section 9	25	A5
	26	C8
	27	B1
Section 10	28	B7

Group structure adopted by the European Parliament (left) and example of list ordering compatible with the group structure (right).

Shortcomings and limitations

- **Volatility:** seat attribution on each list is greatly affected by the number and design of groups, and not solely by lists' electoral performance or Member States' demography.
- **Structural discrimination:** the group system structurally favours the largest countries of each group and discriminates against the smallest.
- **Over-representation:** the proposal does not adequately prevent over-representation of certain nationalities.
- **Limited respect for parties/lists' preferences:** the extensive re-ordering process fails to respect parties/lists' preferences in the election of their candidates.

These issues are presented in more details in our dedicated detailed outline. 

Solution: the Ranked apportionment method

The Ranked apportionment method was designed specifically for the purpose of transnational lists and addresses all the shortcomings of the EP's proposal.

- **Stability:** fine-tuning the system leads to incremental and foreseeable changes in the end results.
- **Equal chance:** seat attribution is solely decided by lists' electoral performance and Member States' demography (intrinsic criteria); there are no structural premiums for or discrimination against States.
- **Fair representation:** each Member State achieves a fair representation on the transnational constituency.
- **Respect for parties/lists' preferences:** diversity is ensured without a large impact on parties/lists' ordering of candidates.

These issues are presented in details in the next slides.

Understanding the Ranked apportionment method ^(1/4)


The **Ranked apportionment method** achieves this result using two complementary mechanisms: 1/ an **apportionment** of Member States' population, and 2/ a **ranking** of candidates' election.

Firstly, the Ranked apportionment method carries out an apportionment of the seats on the transnational constituency based on Member States' populations.

This apportionment gives us the *maximum* number of citizens that each Member State can see elected on the transnational constituency, ensuring a representation in line with Member States' demography.

This assessment is supplemented with cut-off and floor values; for instance, each Member States should have its *maximum* number of elected citizens set to at least 1, so that it may have elected citizens. The outcome can be further modulated as is deemed necessary.

Understanding the Ranked apportionment method (2/4)



Member State	Max. elected citizens	Member State	Max. elected citizens
Germany	4	Bulgaria	1
France	4	Denmark	1
Italy	4	Finland	1
Spain	3	Slovakia	1
Poland	3	Ireland	1
Romania	1	Croatia	1
Netherlands	1	Lithuania	1
Belgium	1	Slovenia	1
Greece	1	Latvia	1
Czech Republic	1	Estonia	1
Sweden	1	Cyprus	1
Portugal	1	Luxembourg	1
Hungary	1	Malta	1
Austria	1		

The apportionment of the transnational constituency's seats based on Member States' population (blue bar chart) shows how many elected citizens each Member State should be granted for a population-based representation. We use these figures as maximum values, so that no Member State is unfairly represented.

However, given the EU's extreme demographic disparities, floor and cut-off values should also be used. A floor value of 1 ensures that every Member State may see at least one of its citizens elected, and a cut-off value (here, 4) avoids unwanted levels of representation. This last point is a more political question for Member States to decide.

Understanding the Ranked apportionment method (3/4)

Secondly, the Ranked apportionment method makes use of the ranking of elected candidates.

In any proportional election, when parties/lists' votes are tallied, the apportionment method* provides not only the number of elected candidates for each party, but also the order in which these candidates are elected.

This ranking is often discarded, as elected candidates are simply the first ones on each list, but it provides useful information about each party/list's electoral performance: a better-fairing party will see its candidates elected before worse-fairing parties.

Since each Member State now has a maximum number of citizens it can see elected, this ranking allows us to give a preference to parties/lists based directly on their electoral performance.

* Currently, the D'Hondt method for European elections.

Understanding the Ranked apportionment method (4/4)

Electoral list	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
EPP	40.003.021	20.001.510	13.334.340	10.000.755	8.000.604	6.667.170	5.714.717	5.000.378
PES	34.715.684	17.357.842	11.571.895	8.678.921	6.943.137	5.785.947	4.959.383	4.339.460
ID	22.723.801	11.361.901	7.574.600	5.680.950	4.544.760	3.787.300	3.246.257	2.840.475
ALDE	18.525.936	9.262.968	6.175.312	4.631.484	3.705.187	3.087.656	2.646.562	2.315.742
EGP	17.503.636	8.751.818	5.834.545	4.375.909	3.500.727	2.917.273	2.500.519	2.187.955
ECR	12.972.015	6.486.008	4.324.005	3.243.004	2.594.403	2.162.003	1.853.145	1.621.502
PEL	12.305.769	6.152.885	4.101.923	3.076.442	2.461.154	2.050.962	1.757.967	1.538.221
EDP	3.795.119	1.897.559	1.265.040	948.780	759.024	632.520	542.160	474.390
EFA	3.359.591	1.679.796	1.119.864	839.898	671.918	559.932	479.942	419.949
ECPM	773.502	386.751	257.834	193.376	154.700	128.917	110.500	96.688

Seat number	Electoral list	Seat number	Electoral list
1	EPP	15	EGP
2	PES	16	PES
3	ID	17	EPP
4	EPP	18	ID
5	ALDE	19	PES
6	EGP	20	EPP
7	PES	21	ECR
8	EPP	22	ALDE
9	ECR	23	PEL
10	PEL	24	EGP
11	PES	25	PES
12	ID	26	EPP
13	EPP	27	ID
14	ALDE	28	EPP

The apportionment of the transnational constituency's seats based on parties/lists' votes gives us not only each party/list's number of elected candidates, but also the order in which they are elected.

The table above summarises the result of the D'Hondt apportionment. With over 40 million votes, the EPP receives the first seat; with over 34 million votes, the PES receives the second seat, and ID the third. However, the EPP receives the fourth seat, following the reduction of its votes*, before ALDE receives the fifth seat.

The process is iterated until all 28 seats are attributed and the result is given in the right-hand-side table.

*According to the D'Hondt apportionment, each time a party receives a seat, its number of votes is reduced by a factor $n+1$, where n is the number of seats already won by that party; the Webster method uses a $2n+1$ factor.

Process ^(1/2)

We now have, on the one hand, a maximum number of citizens that can be elected from each Member State, and, on the other, the order of priority in which each party/list receives its seats.

In order to establish the list of elected candidates, all that remains is to attribute the seats on the transnational constituency to each party/list in the determined order of priority and in line with each Member State's maximum number of elected citizens.

The process of the Ranked apportionment method can be summarised as follows:

“When distributing seats according to the established ranking, no Member State shall see more of its citizens elected — from all electoral lists combined — than its apportioned maximum number of seats.”

Process – Example (1/3)

- The first seat goes to the EPP, with its first candidate from Germany;
 - ✓ the candidate is elected, and Germany is noted as having one citizen elected.
- The second seat goes to the PES, with its first candidate from Spain;
 - ✓ the candidate is elected, and Spain is noted as having one citizens elected.
- The process is repeated one seat at a time.

Seat number	Electoral list	Seat number	Electoral list	Seat number	Electoral list	Seat number	Electoral list
1	EPP	8	EPP	15	EGP	22	ALDE
2	PES	9	ECR	16	PES	23	PEL
3	ID	10	PEL	17	EPP	24	EGP
4	EPP	11	PES	18	ID	25	PES
5	ALDE	12	ID	19	PES	26	EPP
6	EGP	13	EPP	20	EPP	27	ID
7	PES	14	ALDE	21	ECR	28	EPP

Member State	Max.	Elected citizens	Member State	Max.	Elected citizens	Member State	Max.	Elected citizens
Germany	4	1	Czech Rep.	1	0	Ireland	1	0
France	4	0	Sweden	1	0	Croatia	1	0
Italy	4	0	Portugal	1	0	Lithuania	1	0
Spain	3	1	Hungary	1	0	Slovenia	1	0
Poland	3	0	Austria	1	0	Latvia	1	0
Romania	1	0	Bulgaria	1	0	Estonia	1	0
Nether.	1	0	Denmark	1	0	Cyprus	1	0
Belgium	1	0	Finland	1	0	Lux.	1	0
Greece	1	0	Slovakia	1	0	Malta	1	0

	ALDE	ECR	EGP	EPP	ID	PEL	PES
1	France	Poland	Germany	Germany	Italy	France	Spain
2	Spain	Italy	France	Poland	France	Greece	Italy
3	Romania	Spain	Belgium	Romania	Germany	Germany	Germany
4	Nether.	Czech Rep.	Italy	Spain	Belgium	Spain	Romania
5	Denmark	Sweden	Nether.	Italy	Austria	Ireland	Portugal
6	Germany	Nether.	Austria	France	Finland	Portugal	Poland

Left: order of seats to attribute to parties/lists

Right top: maximum seats and elected candidates per Member State

Right bottom: first candidates on transnational lists with elected candidates

Process – Example (2/3)

- However, while seat 16 should go to a candidate from Romania (the PES' fourth candidate), Romania has already reached its maximum of 1 (#3, EPP list).
- The PES' fourth candidate is therefore crossed off the list and the seat is assigned to the PES' next-available candidate – candidate 5 from Portugal, which has not yet reached its maximum.

Member State	Max.	Elected citizens	Member State	Max.	Elected citizens	Member State	Max.	Elected citizens
Germany	4	3	Czech Rep.	1	0	Ireland	1	0
France	4	4	Sweden	1	0	Croatia	1	0
Italy	4	2	Portugal	1	0	Lithuania	1	0
Spain	3	3	Hungary	1	0	Slovenia	1	0
Poland	3	2	Austria	1	0	Latvia	1	0
Romania	1	1	Bulgaria	1	0	Estonia	1	0
Nether.	1	0	Denmark	1	0	Cyprus	1	0
Belgium	1	0	Finland	1	0	Lux.	1	0
Greece	1	0	Slovakia	1	0	Malta	1	0

	ALDE	ECR	EGP	EPP	ID	PEL	PES
1	France	Poland	Germany	Germany	Italy	France	Spain
2	Spain	Italy	France	Poland	France	Greece	Italy
3	Romania	Spain	Belgium	Romania	Germany	Germany	Germany
4	Nether.	Czech Rep.	Italy	Spain	Belgium	Spain	Romania
5	Denmark	Sweden	Nether.	Italy	Austria	Ireland	Portugal
6	Germany	Nether.	Austria	France	Finland	Portugal	Poland

Seat number	Electoral list	Seat number	Electoral list	Seat number	Electoral list	Seat number	Electoral list
1	EPP	8	EPP	15	EGP	22	ALDE
2	PES	9	ECR	16	PES	23	PEL
3	ID	10	PEL	17	EPP	24	EGP
4	EPP	11	PES	18	ID	25	PES
5	ALDE	12	ID	19	PES	26	EPP
6	EGP	13	EPP	20	EPP	27	ID
7	PES	14	ALDE	21	ECR	28	EPP

Left: order of seats to attribute to parties/lists; seat 16 is to be attributed.

Right top: maximum seats and elected candidates per Member State; Member States in yellow have reached their maximum.

Right bottom: first candidates on transnational lists with elected candidates; since Romania has reached its maximum, the next candidate from the PES is elected.

Process – Example (3/3)

- At the end of the process, all the seats on the transnational list have been attributed to their respective party/list.
 - ✓ Parties/lists have their proportional number of seats;
 - ✓ Member States have a representation inline with their demography;
 - ✓ The number of skipped candidates remains limited.



Member State	Max.	Elected citizens	Member State	Max.	Elected citizens	Member State	Max.	Elected citizens
Germany	4	4	Czech Rep.	1	0	Ireland	1	1
France	4	4	Sweden	1	1	Croatia	1	0
Italy	4	4	Portugal	1	1	Lithuania	1	0
Spain	3	3	Hungary	1	0	Slovenia	1	0
Poland	3	3	Austria	1	1	Latvia	1	0
Romania	1	1	Bulgaria	1	1	Estonia	1	0
Nether.	1	1	Denmark	1	0	Cyprus	1	0
Belgium	1	1	Finland	1	1	Lux.	1	0
Greece	1	1	Slovakia	1	0	Malta	1	0

	ALDE	ECR	EGP	EPP	ID	PEL	PES
1	France	Poland	Germany	Germany	Italy	France	Spain
2	Spain	Italy	France	Poland	France	Greece	Italy
3	Romania	Spain	Belgium	Romania	Germany	Germany	Germany
4	Nether.	Czech Rep.	Italy	Spain	Belgium	Spain	Romania
5	Denmark	Sweden	Nether.	Italy	Austria	Ireland	Portugal
6	Germany	Nether.	Austria	France	Finland	Portugal	Poland
7	Czech Rep.	Bulgaria	Sweden	Greece	Czech Rep.	Cyprus	France
8	Belgium	Latvia	Finland	Austria	Denmark	Belgium	Nether.
9	Sweden	Greece	Denmark	Portugal	Nether.	Nether.	Sweden
10	Finland	Slovakia	Ireland	Bulgaria	Estonia	Sweden	Austria

Seat number	Electoral list	Seat number	Electoral list	Seat number	Electoral list	Seat number	Electoral list
1	EPP	8	EPP	15	EGP	22	ALDE
2	PES	9	ECR	16	PES	23	PEL
3	ID	10	PEL	17	EPP	24	EGP
4	EPP	11	PES	18	ID	25	PES
5	ALDE	12	ID	19	PES	26	EPP
6	EGP	13	EPP	20	EPP	27	ID
7	PES	14	ALDE	21	ECR	28	EPP

Outcome ^(1/4)

- **Stability:** fine-tuning the system leads to incremental and foreseeable changes in the end results.
 - For instance, in the determination of Member States' maximum number of elected candidates, a more regressive apportionment can be used to limit the representation of the largest Member States. As expected, this slightly decreases the maximum representation of the largest Member States.




Left: maximum number of eligible citizens under normal parameter.
Right: maximum number of eligible citizens using a regressive factor for the Webster apportionment.

- Alternatively, the maximum value can be raised to 1 for Member States at 0 and 2 for those at 1. This allows greater representation for middle-size States but limits the number of States represented.



Outcome (2/4)

- **Equal chance:** seat attribution is solely decided by parties/lists' electoral performance and Member States' demography (intrinsic criteria); there are no structural premiums for or discrimination against States.
 - Both the number of seats for parties/lists and the order of their distribution are the direct result of parties/lists' electoral performance;
 - Maximum numbers of elected candidates per Member State only reflect demography.



Outcome (3/4)

- **Fair representation:** while the meaning of fair representation can be discussed – especially given the EU’s extreme population imbalance and the very limited number of seats on the transnational constituency –, each Member State achieves a level of representation that is commensurate with its demography.



Outcome (4/4)

- Respect for parties/lists' preferences: diversity is ensured without a large impact on parties/lists' initial ordering of candidates.

	ALDE	ECPM	ECR	EDP	EFA	EGP	EPP	ID	PEL	PES	Pirates	Volt
1	France	Nether.	Poland	France	Spain	Germany	Germany	Italy	France	Spain	Czech Rep	Germany
2	Spain	Germany	Italy	Germany	Belgium	France	Poland	France	Greece	Italy	Germany	Nether.
3	Romania	Romania	Spain	Spain	France	Belgium	Romania	Germany	Germany	Germany	Denmark	Spain
4	Nether.	Croatia	Czech Rep	Italy	Latvia	Italy	Spain	Belgium	Spain	Romania	Italy	Belgium
5	Denmark	Slovakia	Sweden	Romania	Italy	Nether.	Italy	Austria	Ireland	Portugal	France	Lux.
6	Germany	Spain	Nether.	Belgium	Germany	Austria	France	Finland	Portugal	Poland	Sweden	Bulgaria
7	Czech Rep	Italy	Bulgaria	Greece	Greece	Sweden	Greece	Czech Rep	Cyprus	France	Spain	France
8	Belgium	Latvia	Latvia	Slovenia	Czech Rep	Finland	Austria	Denmark	Belgium	Nether.	Lux.	Italy
9	Sweden	France	Greece	Portugal	Slovakia	Denmark	Portugal	Nether.	Nether.	Sweden	Finland	Poland
10	Finland	Poland	Slovakia	Croatia	Poland	Ireland	Bulgaria	Estonia	Sweden	Austria	Nether.	Romania
11	Bulgaria	Belgium	Lithuania	Cyprus	Romania	Lithuania	Sweden	Hungary	Czech Rep	Hungary	Poland	Greece
12	Estonia	Greece	Germany	Poland	Nether.	Portugal	Nether.	Bulgaria	Finland	Bulgaria	Romania	Czech Rep
13	Slovakia	Czech Rep	Belgium	Nether.	Sweden	Spain	Ireland	Greece	Italy	Croatia	Belgium	Sweden
14	Hungary	Sweden	Croatia	Czech Rep	Portugal	Lux.	Czech Rep	Slovakia	Denmark	Malta	Greece	Portugal
15	Ireland	Portugal	France	Sweden	Hungary	Poland	Slovakia	Poland	Romania	Belgium	Portugal	Hungary
16	Slovenia	Hungary	Luxembourg	Hungary	Austria	Czech Republic	Belgium	Spain	Slovenia	Denmark	Hungary	Austria
17	Luxembourg	Austria	Finland	Austria	Bulgaria	Hungary	Lithuania	Romania	Austria	Slovakia	Austria	Denmark
18	Italy	Bulgaria	Romania	Bulgaria	Denmark	Greece	Croatia	Sweden	Luxembourg	Greece	Bulgaria	Finland

	ALDE	ECPM	ECR	EDP	EFA	EGP	EPP	ID	PEL	PES	Pirates	Volt
1	France	Nether.	Poland	France	Spain	Germany	Germany	Italy	France	Spain	Czech Rep	Germany
2	Spain	Germany	Italy	Germany	Belgium	France	Poland	France	Greece	Italy	Germany	Nether.
3	Romania	Romania	Spain	Spain	France	Belgium	Romania	Germany	Germany	Germany	Denmark	Spain
4	Nether.	Croatia	Czech Rep	Italy	Latvia	Italy	Spain	Belgium	Spain	Romania	Italy	Belgium
5	Denmark	Slovakia	Sweden	Romania	Italy	Nether.	Italy	Austria	Ireland	Portugal	France	Lux.
6	Germany	Spain	Nether.	Belgium	Germany	Austria	France	Finland	Portugal	Poland	Sweden	Bulgaria
7	Czech Rep	Italy	Bulgaria	Greece	Greece	Sweden	Greece	Czech Rep	Cyprus	France	Spain	France
8	Belgium	Latvia	Latvia	Slovenia	Czech Rep	Finland	Austria	Denmark	Belgium	Nether.	Lux.	Italy
9	Sweden	France	Greece	Portugal	Slovakia	Denmark	Portugal	Nether.	Nether.	Sweden	Finland	Poland
10	Finland	Poland	Slovakia	Croatia	Poland	Ireland	Bulgaria	Estonia	Sweden	Austria	Nether.	Romania
11	Bulgaria	Belgium	Lithuania	Cyprus	Romania	Lithuania	Sweden	Hungary	Czech Rep	Hungary	Poland	Greece
12	Estonia	Greece	Germany	Poland	Nether.	Portugal	Nether.	Bulgaria	Finland	Bulgaria	Romania	Czech Rep
13	Slovakia	Czech Rep	Belgium	Nether.	Sweden	Spain	Ireland	Greece	Italy	Croatia	Belgium	Sweden
14	Hungary	Sweden	Croatia	Czech Rep	Portugal	Lux.	Czech Rep	Slovakia	Denmark	Malta	Greece	Portugal
15	Ireland	Portugal	France	Sweden	Hungary	Poland	Slovakia	Poland	Romania	Belgium	Portugal	Hungary
16	Slovenia	Hungary	Luxembourg	Hungary	Austria	Czech Republic	Belgium	Spain	Slovenia	Denmark	Hungary	Austria
17	Luxembourg	Austria	Finland	Austria	Bulgaria	Hungary	Lithuania	Romania	Austria	Slovakia	Austria	Denmark
18	Italy	Bulgaria	Romania	Bulgaria	Denmark	Greece	Croatia	Sweden	Luxembourg	Greece	Bulgaria	Finland

Left: EP Proposal
Right: Ranked apportionment method

Candidates elected using the Ranked apportionment method are very close to electoral lists' original ordering.

In conclusion

- The Ranked apportionment method has the same benefits as the EP's proposal: it works with a single EU constituency, ensures that parties/lists receive a number of seats proportional to the votes cast in their favour, and promotes Member State diversity.
- However, by design, the Ranked apportionment method solves all the shortcomings identified with the EP's proposal. By introducing an apportionment of seats according to Member States' population and using the precise order in which candidates are elected, it ensures that all Member States receive a fair level of representation. Better-fairing parties receive an advantage in the form of the priority in the allocation of seats.
- Also, by doing away with the EP proposal's use of group system, the Ranked apportionment method is stable and predictable, does not give arbitrary structural advantages to certain Member States, and only has a limited impact on parties/lists' preferred ordering of their candidates.
- Overall, the Ranked apportionment method satisfactorily solves all identified issues with the election of a transnational constituency, and can ensure the democratic appointment of our European representatives. It is easy to explain, easy to implement, and ready for adoption for the 2024 European elections.

Annex 1 – Comparison

EP proposal

- Single constituency, votes tallied at EU level ✓
- Seats attributed in proportion to votes ✓
- Results extremely volatile when groups are changed ✗
- Distribution based on design of the group system (extrinsic factor) creating structural discrimination ✗
- Over-representation still occurs for medium and small Member States ✗
- High impact on list ordering ✗

Ranked apportionment method

- Single constituency, votes tallied at EU level ✓
- Seats attributed in proportion to votes ✓
- Stable results when system is fine-tuned ✓
- Distribution only based on electoral performance and demography (intrinsic factors) ✓
- Fair geographical representation ensured for all Member states ✓
- Minimal impact on list ordering ✓

Annex 2 – Additional considerations

Beyond the *distribution system*, other parameters must be considered.

- Apportionment method: **Webster** is more neutral than D'Hondt (which favours larger parties).
- Gender balance: lists should be **gender-alternate** (with no two consecutive positions occupied by candidates of the same gender)
- Member State criteria: **citizenship** should be used over residence (the transnational constituency is not meant to ensure geographical distribution but political diversity; it does not matter where candidates currently live, but instead where they stem from).
- Engaging citizens: **open** lists contribute to involving citizens in the choice of their representatives.
- Number of candidates: no need to require lists/parties to have too many candidates as most will not be elected anyway; this is a needless burden on small parties (9 should be a maximum).
- Double candidacies: candidates (at least, list leaders) should be allowed to feature both on European and national lists to ensure the election of the Spitzenkandidaten (where a list earns at least one seat), foster links between national and European levels, and avoid EU lists of second-grade candidates (as the transnational lists seems too risky).

Annex 3 – Q&A (1/9)

Why limit the number of citizens that can be elected from each Member State?

As most proportionally-elected bodies, the European Parliament ensures the representation of all its constitutive entities — using fixed sizes for Member States' delegations. Likewise, a transnational constituency should avoid being overly or entirely made up of candidates from a small number of Member States, but instead provide a diversity of representation, leading to the introduction of limitations on each Member State's number of eligible citizens from transnational lists.

The EP's proposal simply sets a limit at six elected candidates per Member State; the Ranked apportionment method provide more fine-tuning by introducing limits based on Member States' demography — in the same way as the European Parliament's current national delegations are based on Member States' demography.

Q&A (2/9)

What if more parties/lists want to elect candidates from smaller Member States?

Parties and lists are strongly encouraged to diversify their pool of candidates and to place candidates from smaller Member States in eligible positions. This is why both the EP's proposal and the Ranked apportionment method request that the first seats be occupied by citizens of different Member States.

However, this should not lead to blatant cases of over-representation which are detrimental to the fair representation of EU citizens.

Owing to the principle of "degressive representation", EU citizens from Malta are already ten times more represented in the European Parliament than EU citizens from Germany; the transnational constituency should not worsen this imbalance. The EP's proposal leads to over-representations by factors of 20, 30, even 80. By contrast, the Ranked apportionment method puts a clear cap on these ratios.

Q&A (3/9)

Why not ensure at least one elected candidate from each Member State?

The European Parliament has decided on a 28-seat transnational constituency, which means that ensuring one elected candidate from each Member State would use all but one of the constituency's seats.

Doing so would lead to a clear over-representation of citizens from medium and smaller Member States, but drastically fail to respect parties/lists' choices in the election of their candidates.

More importantly, it would re-introduce a nation-centric approach, where the transnational constituency, by design, aims at bringing a party-led European approach: seats are not attributed to Member States for, first and foremost, to European political parties or movements.

What is fair representation?

The question of fairness for representation is an eminently political question: it is what those who are represented consider as fair among themselves.

However, since the European Parliament aims at representing European citizens, a natural basis for a fair representation should generally be in line with all Member States' population sizes: larger Member States should be more likely to see more of their citizens elected, since this would lead to closer numbers of representatives-per-citizens across Member States.

This is why the Ranked apportionment method uses a population-based apportionment to assess a maximum number of eligible citizens for each Member State. It also relies on the Webster method of apportionment, which is proven to be more neutral, while the D'Hondt method would favour larger Member States.

The Ranked apportionment method also allows for more regressive apportionment factors, increasing the potential representation of smaller Member States should decision-makers desire it.

Q&A (5/9)

Why can some Member States only have a single representative or not at all?

In order to ensure a fair representation for the citizens of all Member States, the Ranked apportionment method applies population-based caps on the number of eligible candidates per Member State.

For the smallest Member States, a maximum *entirely* based on their population would not warrant any eligible citizens. This is of course not politically desirable, and the Ranked apportionment method exceptionally raises this lowest cap to 1: these Member States are therefore able to see one of their citizens elected – although this may not happen if these candidates do not feature high enough on electoral lists.

Decision-makers can decide that a cap of 1 is too low and set it to 2, either for all smaller Member States or for those already allowed one eligible citizen before the aforementioned exception.

However, this decision has consequences: by allowing more Member States to see 2 of their citizens elected, and given the small size of the transnational constituency, this will mechanically decrease the number of Member States represented, and more of the smallest Member States are likely to remain without citizens elected.

Q&A (6/9)

Why not use groups of Member States to ensure diversity?

The EP's proposal relies on a group system to promote diversity, and diversity does increase compared to a system devoid of diversity-promoting measures.

However, this group system does not improve diversity more than the Ranked apportionment method and comes at a heavy cost: it is highly volatile, it cannot alone prevent over-representation, it fails to respect parties/lists' preferences, and, most importantly, it creates an unavoidable structural discrimination against the Member States located near the bottom of their group.

Therefore, while promoting diversity is important and the use of a group system seems like an easy remedy, this system fails to give equal chances for representation and is therefore not acceptable for democratic representation.

Why is it important to have a stable system?

Following the decision to choose one system or another, a number of settings can impact the use and outcome of the chosen system.

For instance, choosing a group system leaves the door open to changes in the number or structure of the groups. Likewise, choosing the Ranked apportionment methods leaves open the choice of the apportionment method for the population-based apportionment, and of the overall cut-off and floor values to be used.

All these factors impact the eventual representation of Member States. However, changing the parameters of the group system leads to drastic and unpredictable changes in outcome, making any precise decision impossible and any change a jump into the unknown.

By contrast, changing the parameters of the Ranked apportionment method only leads to incremental and foreseeable changes, leading to choices made knowingly and purposefully.

Why do parties/lists' preferences matter?

The transnational constituency aims at providing European-wide political representation: European parties and movements present their lists of candidates to all voting EU citizens regardless of national borders.

Upon establishing their lists, European parties and movements make a conscious decision of who they would like to see elected in priority; this is reflected in the order of the lists.

The strict ordering of these lists may be at odds with the concurrent goal of ensuring a fair representation to citizens of all Member States. However, as far as this ordering is compatible with fair levels of representation, parties/lists' preferences should be respected.

The EP's proposal is shown to drastically impact this ordering, and to skip large numbers of candidates as it seeks to improve diversity.

By contrast, the Ranked apportionment method ensures fair representation with only a limited impact on parties/lists' ordering, and is therefore far more respectful of European parties and movements' political preferences.

Q&A (9/9)

Is the Ranked apportionment method the perfect system for transnational lists?

Given the limited size of the transnational constituency, there can be no perfect system that ensures a fair representation for citizens of Member States *and* guarantees the presence of citizens of all Members States on the transnational constituency *and* respects the preferences of parties/lists. This would require a much larger constituency or, preferably, an entirely new electoral system based on mixed-member representation.

However, where the EP's proposal embeds winners and losers in the design of the group system, the Ranked apportionment method gives a fair chance to all: smaller Member States can all be awarded representation if their citizens are high enough on electoral lists. It is for parties/lists to decide of this, and should not be the result of a group system which would, at the same time, discriminate against specific Member States.

The Ranked apportionment method, whilst not perfect, provides the best balance between fair representation and equal opportunity, with a sound respect for parties/lists' preferences.